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COMPUTER-AGE VULNERABILITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY
CHRIS LYLE*
M OST AIRLINE APPLICATIONS of computers
predominantly affect the internal administration and
efficiency of the airlines, and the resulting advantages and
problems are probably common to many other industries.
Computer applications in passenger and cargo service
functions such as reservations and ticketing, however,
have multilateral implications unique to the airline indus-
try, particularly in the international context. While auto-
mation undoubtedly has brought benefits in these areas,
many airlines are finding it increasingly difficult to com-
pete in marketing their products. This article focuses on
the vulnerability of the "have-not" airlines, travel agents,
and passengers which has resulted from the development
of highly sophisticated computer reservation systems
(CRSs).
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the early days of civil aviation, information on airline
schedules and fares was distributed by individual airline
companies in the form of printed timetables or newspaper
advertisements. Since the flights and fares were few and
simple and the choice of airlines and routings was very
An earlier version of this article appeared in ITA MAGAZINE, March-April 1988, at
7-11.
* Chief, Air Carrier Tariffs, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Montreal, Canada. M.A., Cambridge University, 1968. The views expressed here
by the author are his own and not necessarily those of ICAO.
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limited, passengers could thereby readily be made aware
of all the products offered. As an increasing plethora of
fares and services became available and airline journeys
involving two or more airlines became commonplace,
however, a need developed for consolidation of the vari-
ous airline timetables for easy reference. This need was
met for many years almost entirely by publishers of multi-
carrier schedule or tariff guides such as the ABC World
Airways Guide, the Official Airline Guide, the Air Tariff,
or the Air Passenger Tariff, which included the schedules
and/or fares of the vast majority of airlines worldwide.
With passengers seeking guidance in selecting the various
options available, and with airlines concomitantly seeking
to sell their services in a wide variety of locations, the
combination of the travel agent and the multi-carrier
guide became an increasingly common tool for marketing
airline tickets.
A fundamental feature of this airline marketing system
was the neutral status attributed both to the multi-carrier
guides and to the travel agents, fostering the principle of
"fair and equal opportunity for airlines to compete" in
foreign markets. In the case of the guides, the publishing
companies operated - and still operate - independently
of the airlines, and financed their operations primarily
from the sale of their publications. In the case of the
travel agents, their "neutrality" was generally founded
upon common accreditation to all member airlines of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), rather
than accreditation to individual airlines, and upon con-
comitant compliance with detailed rules and procedures
agreed upon by airlines within IATA and subsequently
approved by governments.'
This airline distribution system was fertile ground for
IATA rules and procedures regarding travel agents remain in place except in
the United States, where they were replaced in 1984 by those of the International
Airline Travel Agent Network. They are increasingly flexible, however, especially
in Canada, Europe, and the Asia/Pacific region. They are published annually by
IATA (including government reservations) in the IATA PASSENGER AGENCY CON-
FERENCE RESOLUTIONS MANUAL, Ref. No. 5324 (8th ed. issued July 1, 1987).
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the advent of automation, considering the massive pro-
ductivity gains offered by the use of CRSs as compared to
the relatively cumbersome use of printed airline guides
and the telephone or telex. CRSs were initially intro-
duced by large airlines able to meet the heavy investment
costs, which used the systems primarily to facilitate the
transaction of reservations by their own sales staffs for
their own services. As their systems grew and the technol-
ogy developed, however, these airlines were able to in-
clude access by travel agents and also offer other airlines
the opportunity to participate in their systems. In North
America and Europe the majority of scheduled airline
tickets are currently sold using CRSs for the entire trans-
action, and the systems are starting to make significant in-
roads in the other regions of the world. The larger CRSs
contain an inventory of thousands of flights and millions
of fares, handling millions of transactions each day with
an average search and response time of a few seconds.
Unlike the multi-carrier schedule and tariff guides, CRS
ownership and operation is generally not independent of
the airlines. Of some sixty CRSs currently in use by travel
agents around the world, more than fifty are partly or
wholly owned by airlines, and in at least forty-five coun-
tries - over half the countries in which CRSs are known
to be used by travel agents - there is only a single CRS,
controlled by the national airline.2 Also in contrast to the
multi-carrier guides, the schedules and fares of all airlines
are not automatically included in a CRS. While it is often
in the interest of a CRS vendor to include additional list-
ings because these increase the attraction of the system
for a travel agent, such inclusion is at the vendor's discre-
tion. In most countries, the vendor also has the discretion
to give more or less favorable treatment to an airline's
listings. Where vendors do offer the facility, the airlines
concerned generally have to pay for their listings, along
"- Secretariat Study Group on Computer Reservation Systems, ICAO Doc. CRS-SN/5
(Nov. 1987).
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with additional fees for each booking made through the
systems.
As a result, the schedule and fare databases currently
used by travel agents are no longer "neutral". Further,
since for economic reasons travel agents generally prefer
to subscribe only to a single CRS service, the neutrality of
the whole international airline distribution system is
called into question. An added distortion is caused by the
fact that travel agents frequently enter into contractual ar-
rangements with CRS vendors which could be considered
inconsistent with the agents' fundamental contractual ob-
ligations to their airline principals. Thus, while the bene-
fits of CRSs are widely recognized, concerns have been
raised by governments, airlines, and passengers regarding
bias in the screen displays of the various systems and the
potential for abuse of market power by the vendors of the
systems.
II. DISPLAY BIAS
Access to a CRS by a user such as a travel agent is via a
terminal consisting of a keyboard and a visual display unit.
The first step usually is to enter the origin and destination
cities, along with the requested date and time of travel.
The system responds by displaying on a screen various
flight options which are available from its inventory, listed
in order of priority dependent on the requested date and
time of travel but adjusted according to the priority crite-
ria used in the particular CRS concerned.
While CRSs have the capability of listing all the options
between any two points which are contained in their in-
ventory, the screens currently in use permit only a small
number of the options to be displayed at any one time. In
order to see additional options, the travel agent moves
the list up the screen, usually in blocks of one full
"screen" at a time, losing some options at the top and
gaining new ones at the bottom. In view of the economic
pressures of time and resources which travel agents face,
there is an understandable tendency to book one of the
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first options displayed which meets the client's known re-
quirements. As a result, the order in which the CRS oper-
ator lists the available options strongly influences the
probability of reservations being made for each one.
The presentation on the screen may be biased, unwit-
tingly or deliberately, both by the scope of the inventory
of flights in the system and by the priority criteria con-
cerned. There are many ways such bias may be intro-
duced, and the examples quoted in recent years are
numerous. Unlike most of them, the examples below
were not designed for the purpose of demonstrating bias,
but rather are taken from actual airline reservation trans-
actions observed by the author in 1987; they are perhaps
therefore all the more effective in their simple illustration
of the impact which bias may have.
The first example involves a trip from Montreal to Bar-
celona, departing Tuesday, May 12, using a CRS based in
the United States.4 In response to entry of the origin and
destination cities and the requested date, the CRS dis-
played the following flight information on the first
"screen," edited here for ease of presentation:
Estimates from surveys made by CRS vendors in the United States (prior to
1984) showed that seventy to ninety percent of bookings were chosen from the
first screen viewed by the user, and fifty percent from the first listing on the first
screen. See Comments and Proposed Rules of the Department ofJustice before the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (Nov. 17, 1983); Reply Comments of the Department of Justice (Dec. 16,
1983), filed consequent upon EDR-466, Docket 41686, Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking-Airline Computer Reservation Systems (Sept. 9, 1983).
4 The use of a North American-based CRS was inevitable given that the book-
ing was made through a travel agent in Montreal. In general, CRSs in the United
States have less evident "bias" than CRSs in many other countries because they
are subject to specific government regulation and strong competition. The type
of "bias" shown in the example is a vagary of the sheer depth of inventory of
schedules in the CRS concerned and its concomitant ability to construct connec-
tions over numerous points. Most other systems contain fewer options in their
inventory; many, for example, do not display flight options at all between Mon-
treal and Barcelona.
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Destination Depart Arrive Stops
Zurich 2045 1005#1 0
Barcelona 1215 1400 0
Amsterdam 1855 0740#1 0
Barcelona 1200 1405 0
Rome 1515 0925#1 2
Barcelona 1055 1235 0
#I = next day
There were no through flights listed between Montreal
and Barcelona, and the selected "best" connection was on
Swissair via Zurich, followed by a KLM connection via
Amsterdam and an Alitalia connection via Rome.
The similar flight information obtained by scrolling










- Barcelona via London Heathrow and
London Gatwick (British Airways plus
ground transfer to British Airways)
- Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle and
Paris Orly (Air France plus ground transfer
to Iberia)
- Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle and
Paris Orly (Air Canada plus ground
transfer to Iberia)
Screen 3 (summary)
- Barcelona via New York La Guardia and
New York Kennedy (Air Canada plus
ground transfer to TWA)
- Barcelona via Boston (Delta to TWA)
"No More"
Given the absence of further flight information, the op-
erator next "forced" the CRS to construct routings from
Montreal to Barcelona over Madrid, the major hub in
Spain, with the following results:
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Listing Screen 4 (summary)
9 Montreal - Barcelona via London Heathrow and
Madrid (British Airways to British Airways
to Iberia)
10 Montreal - Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle, Paris
Orly and Madrid (Air France plus ground
transfer to Iberia to Iberia)
Listing Screen 5 (summary)
11 Montreal - Barcelona via Amsterdam and Madrid (KLM
to KLM to Iberia)
12 Montreal - Barcelona via Zurich and Madrid (Swissair
to Swissair to Iberia)
"No More"
Finally the operator searched separately for Mon-
treal/Madrid and Madrid/Barcelona flights, building up









Destination Depart Arrive Stops
Madrid 1830 0715#1 0
Barcelona 0850 0950 0
By most perceptions this final listing is superior to each
of the twelve previous ones. In comparison with the
"cream" of the latter - those on the first screen - the
departure time is similar but the origin to destination
elapsed time, at nine hours and twenty minutes, is nearly
two hours less than Listing 1 (Swissair via Zurich), nearly
four hours less than Listing 2 (KLM via Amsterdam), and
six hours less than Listing 3 (Alitalia via Rome). It takes a
highly knowledgeable and persistent operator, however,
to scroll through five screens and intervene actively to ob-
tain this optimum listing and make the relevant reserva-
tions. Clearly, Iberia is highly vulnerable in this example.
Unless it achieves more favorable listings of its transatlan-
tic service with the CRS vendor concerned, the airline's
access to the Montreal market and possibly other markets
in which this CRS is used will be very limited.
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Even more fundamental barriers than "those raised by
screen priority are widening the gap between the "have"
and the "have not" airlines. Many CRSs sustain a differ-
ent form of bias in failing to include any flight information
at all for smaller or less frequently used airlines, or in-
cluding such information only under restricted condi-
tions. For example, for travel from Montreal to Harare in
Zimbabwe, at least one CRS in 1987 not only ignored the
several feasible connections involving the nonstop flights
from London to Harare by Air Zimbabwe, but did not
even contain these flights in its inventory. Another CRS
contained the Air Zimbabwe flights, but reservations on
these flights had to be processed through the traditional
telex channels and took up to three days to confirm, while
reservations on the competing British Airways flights
from London to Harare could be made immediately on-
line. Like Iberia in the previous example, Air Zimbabwe
and other small airlines are highly vulnerable. Unless
they pay for listings and reservations capability on every
major CRS worldwide, they face increasing difficulty in
obtaining traffic in foreign markets.
Of course, it is not just the "have not" airlines that are
made vulnerable in the circumstances described above.
The passenger is being provided with a limited and biased
range of the possible options. In fact, the criteria applied
to determine screen priority frequently and purposely
subsume, at least in part, the individual passenger's own
decision criteria. For example, in a number of CRSs pri-
ority is determined conversely with the number of
"points" accrued by each journey option, using a formula
which ascribes points to the number of minutes the flight
departure time differs from the requested departure time,
plus the number of minutes of elapsed time between de-
parture and arrival, plus "penalty" minutes to be attached
to journeys involving multiple stops, a change in airlines
en-route, or a ground transfer between airports. Thus, in
some CRSs a connecting inter-airline option of ten hours
duration, which might already be penalized in practice be-
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cause of the longer connection time necessary at an inter-
mediate airport, may be ranked on the screen below a
connecting intra-airline option of eleven hours and
twenty-five minutes duration between the same origin and
destination cities because there is a prescribed "penalty"
of ninety minutes to be added in the case of the inter-
airline connection. The "penalty" of ninety minutes is ev-
idently completely arbitrary, and many passengers may
prefer to make up their own minds as to the benefit to be
attributed to traveling throughout their journey on the
same airline.
The passenger's ability to control his or her own deci-
sion process is, however, considerably enhanced by cur-
rent computer-aided developments in the airline
distribution network. CRS terminals, along with simpli-
fied reservation systems and ticket printers, are already in-
stalled on the premises of airports, shopping centers,
banks, and private corporations. CRSs may even be ac-
cessed from private homes using personal computers and
modems (mainly in North America) or videotex (mainly in
Europe). The passenger can technically already sit at a
terminal at home, call up pages on-screen from a catalog
which contains not only consumer durables but also serv-
ices, including airline schedules and fares, and make
purchases directly and instantly using a "smart card".
Under this scenario, the travel agent becomes perhaps
the most vulnerable party in the airline industry. The
neutrality of the travel agent has clearly been compro-
mised by the use of biased reservation systems. Passen-
gers have a much greater incentive than travel agents to
find the lowest fare, and with the right tools at their dispo-
sal they may have no need for an intermediary between
themselves and the airlines or the CRS vendor. The air-
lines themselves may be tempted to add to this incentive
by departing from long-established practice and exclud-
ing the retailer's commission from fares that are sold di-
rectly to passengers.
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III. ABUSE OF MARKET POWER
While the implications of the changing nature of the
distribution system described above are generating con-
siderable uneasiness in the airline industry, the overriding
concern at present is that of potential monopoly or collu-
sive power which may arise in markets dominated by one
or two CRSs. Travel agents do not generally need to sub-
scribe to more than one CRS service, provided the sched-
ules and fares for most of the airlines they use are listed
on that system. In fact, the use of additional CRSs would
almost certainly result in additional costs, because the op-
erating procedures for each system differ. Also, under the
terms of their contractual arrangements with CRS ven-
dors, agents are frequently obligated to pay liquidated
damages if they change to another vendor's service.5
These features of CRS service, as well as the very high
investment costs, present substantial barriers to entry by a
new operator into the CRS market, and the power of in-
cumbent operators is large and increasing.
This power and its potential influence on the airline in-
dustry is illustrated by the fact that the biggest CRS, the
SABRE system owned by American Airlines, generated
operating revenues of $405 million in 1987, a sum larger
than the individual revenues of more than half of the
world's international scheduled airlines in the same year.
SABRE's operating profits were $107 million,6 a figure
surpassed by a mere handful of airlines in absolute terms
Economic regulations introduced in the United States in 1984, see infra note
12, limit contracts between CRS vendors and travel agents to a maximum period
of five years, but are silent regarding liquidated damages clauses for an earlier
change by an agent to another system. See 14 C.F.R. § 255 (1984). Such clauses
were subsequently included (or retained) in contractual arrangements and have
been invoked and/or challenged in a number of well-publicized cases. See Ameri-
can CRS Lawsuit Without Merit, Continental Says, Aviation Daily, Oct. 27, 1987, at
141; see also Godwin, AAL Charges System Ones Conversions Are Improper, Travel
Weekly, Nov. 26, 1987. In 1987, some United States vendors were calling for
legislation to abolish liquidated damages clauses. Pestronk, Liquidated Damages Are
Unenforceable, Travel Weekly, Jan. 18, 1988; see also American Opposes DOT Computer
Reservations Rulemaking, Aviation Daily, Nov. 5, 1987, at 199.
,; Bailey, CRS: the Battle for Europe, Flight International, Feb. 27, 1988, at 34.
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and by no major airline in terms of percentage of operat-
ing revenues.7 With a capital investment of billions of
dollars, SABRE is able to offer a massive and comprehen-
sive database, a high quality and a wide range of services,
and benefits from economies of scale and scope which can
be matched by less than a handful of other CRSs.
Initially, the services of CRSs were offered only in the
countries in which they were based or, occasionally, in
other markets in which the airline vendors of the CRSs
operated. The vendors of SABRE and other systems
based in the United States, along with the vendors of one
or two systems from European countries, however, are
now actively marketing their services around the world
with some success. A positive aspect of this development
is that it has instilled an element of competition among
CRSs in several countries, resulting in improved quality
and price of CRS service to users.
There are a number of perceived or real disadvantages,
however. For example, there is widespread concern over
the implications of the entry into, and possible takeover
of, national distribution systems by foreign operators.
With regard to this concern, some governments and air-
lines have been accused of applying restrictive business
practices against the entry of foreign CRSs in the form of
legal, telecommunication, technical, and administrative
obstacles.' A parallel defense being mounted in some
countries to combat an invasion of foreign CRSs is the
development of multinational "megasystems. ''9
7 ICAO Digest of Statistics: Financial Data on Commercial Air Carriers, ICAO Doc.
342, Series F-No. 40 (1987) and updated reports to ICAO.
Such practices have been reported in an ICAO survey of Member States con-
ducted in 1987, as well as in various press reports and published articles. See, e.g.,
Fahy, Regulation of Computerized Reservation Systems in the United States and Europe, 11
AIR L. 240-41 (1986).
' In 1987 two conglomerate CRSs were announced in Europe: "Amadeus"
owned in equal shares by Air France, Iberia, Lufthansa, and SAS, with software
provided under license from "SystemOne" (owned by Texas Air); and "Galileo"
owned in equal shares by British Airways, KLM, Swissair, and Covia Corporation
(United Airlines), with software provided by "Apollo" (owned by Covia Corpora-
tion). Similar "megasystems" were also proposed in the Asia/Pacific region:
"Abacus" founded by Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines, and Thai International;
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The airline distribution system, therefore, faces the
dual threats of worldwide domination by a handful of
CRSs and monopoly control in individual countries. The
potential for manipulation of the airline market by a dom-
inant or monopoly CRS vendor is substantial. For exam-
ple, such a vendor could have the power to decide which
airlines will have their services included in its system and
to manipulate the input provided by those airlines, as well
as the power to dictate unduly profitable or discriminatory
charges to the airlines. The vendor could similarly direct
the activities of travel agents. Additionally, the vendor
has direct access to a vast range of commercially-sensitive
information with respect to all participating parties, in-
cluding full details of every reservation transaction made.
Where the CRS concerned is owned by an airline, the im-
plications of this market power are particularly important.
IV. COPING WITH THE PROBLEMS
To the extent possible, airlines and travel agents are at-
tempting to resolve the problems arising from CRS devel-
opments without resorting to government assistance or
legislation. For example, through their international
trade association, IATA, the airlines are developing a
worldwide fares database with a view to providing CRS
vendors with comprehensive, up-to-date, and unbiased
fares information at a low cost.' ° Additionally, travel
agents are combatting the threat of being bypassed and
losing commissions from the sale of airline tickets by en-
tering into tripartite agreements" with CRS vendors and
corporate travel departments which focus on the provi-
and "RICHS" (Regional Integrated Co-Hosting System) for region-wide applica-
tion by the Orient Airlines Association.
- IATA, REPORT OF THE TRAFFIC COMMITrEE TO THE 43D ANNUAL GENERAL
MEETING (Oct. 26-28, 1987). See also IA TA/A TPCO to Launch "4// Fares" Data Base,
IATA News Release (Mar. 15, 1988).
,, Such agreements have been formally accepted in the United States through
the procedures of the International Airline Travel Agent Network and in Canada
through IATA Resolution 804. See IATA PASSENGER AGENCY CONFERENCE RESO-
LUTIONS MANUAL, supra note 1, at 125-175.
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sion of "ancillary" services. Such services include dis-
counts on hotel and car hire through bulk purchase, flight
travel insurance, and the issuance of travelers' checks.
The response of the marketplace, however, may not be
sufficient in itself. The United States government, while
leading the thrust toward more general deregulation of
the airlines, found a need to introduce domestic regula-
tions against bias in CRSs in 1984,12 and other govern-
ments are considering similar action. On the
international front, a number of governments have ad-
dressed CRS concerns in the past two or three years by
invoking the "fair and equal opportunity" provision which
appears in the majority of the bilateral air service agree-
ments that regulate international civil aviation.
CRSs have a range of implications for the role of gov-
ernments in fostering the public interest. Governments
may need to ensure that airlines have equal access to
CRSs and receive equal treatment when participating in
them. Governments may also need to ensure that the sys-
tems themselves are given equal access to telecommunica-
tions networks, are available on an equally competitive
footing, and are not monopolistic in nature. On a more
fundamental note, governments may need to ensure that
data storage and transmission through CRSs does not vio-
late national legislation or the constitutional rights of in-
dividuals, and that CRSs are not used for fraudulent
purposes.
CRSs are frequently subject to general legislation such
as that governing competition, contractual arrangements,
and/or telecommunications. With the exception of the
United States, however, no government has yet addressed
CRS issues specifically in its national legislation. Addi-
tionally, there are as yet no bilateral or multilateral instru-
ments which focus on CRS issues. One reason for the lack
of regulation is the difficulty of finding an effective
12 14 C.F.R. § 255 (1984). The functions of the United States Civil Aeronautics
Board, including responsibility for the regulations concerned, were taken by the
Department of Transportation in 1985.
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formula. It must be recognized, for example, that some
degree of display bias is inherent in any ordering of flights
and that, given the multitude of flight options available
for many city-pairs and the limited space available on the
screen, the CRS vendor has a need to select and priori-
tize. Also, there is limited value in setting out detailed
anti-bias regulations for CRS vendors when current tech-
nology enables the travel agent and/or other users to
change the sequence of presentation at the terminal.
In this context, the use of the personal computer rather
than a "dumb terminal" is a fast moving trend which has
important implications because of the ability it offers
users to store and manipulate information provided by
the airlines or the CRS vendor. Personal computer
software already available at low cost enables selection
from a CRS of the lowest fare and associated customized
optimum routing, in effect overriding the screen priority
parameters set by the vendor. Current personal com-
puter technology includes multiple "windows" on the
same screen whereby, for example, flights, fares, a passen-
ger's preference profile, and the "passenger name rec-
ord" (through which the reservation is developed and
recorded) may all be viewed simultaneously and changed
interactively. Such technological developments are bring-
ing considerable power to the fingertips of the user.
While these developments offer greatly increased oppor-
tunities for augmenting bias at the terminal, to the extent
that such bias discriminates in favor of individual passen-
ger preferences, problems with bias should become less
critical. Airlines and governments may be concerned,
however, that a travel agent can apply the same technol-
ogy to discriminate in favor of a particular airline rather
than a particular passenger.
In summary, it appears that direct government regula-
tion of CRS display bias may be ineffective, perhaps un-
necessary, or at least premature. There are, however,
other means of addressing both display bias and more
general CRS issues. Two potential tools are: (1) the di-
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vestiture of CRS ownership or operation from the air-
lines, and (2) the introduction of measures to encourage
and maintain competition among CRS vendors.
Occasional calls for divestiture arise both in the United
States' 3 and internationally 4 on the ground that divesti-
ture would eliminate the ability of airlines which control
CRSs to manipulate the distribution of the products of
their competitors. The net benefits of divestiture are,
however, somewhat nebulous. 5 Divestiture should re-
duce bias, since an independent vendor or operator
would have no particular incentive to maintain it, pro-
vided controls are placed on malpractice in the relation-
ship between the vendor and an airline client. The
probable economies of scope available from operating
both an airline and a CRS would be lost, however, result-
ing in the prospect of higher user fees. In addition, ven-
dors would lose some of the incentive to upgrade their
systems as technology develops and to provide for the
specialized needs of the airline industry. From the gov-
ernmental perspective, divestiture could simply shift the
possibility for abuse in the field of air transport to a sector
beyond the control of the air transport regulatory author-
ity, with ensuing national and bilateral implications.
At the same time, airline-owned CRSs will soon face
competition from new entrants in the market as mail-or-
der houses and magazine publishers begin using existing
For example, proponents of divestiture include Edward Beauvais, chairman
of America West Airlines; Michael Levine, former senioi official of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board; and the Consumer Federation of America. See Dorsey, America West
Leader to Congress: Force Lines to Divest Res Systems, Travel Weekly, Nov. 26, 1987, at
1; CRS Legislation Seen as Last Resort, Aviation Daily, Dec. 11, 1987; States, Consumer
Groups Battle Airlines, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Feb. 1988, at 35.
14 The most notable call for divestiture internationally comes from the Interna-
tional Organization of Consumers' Unions (IOCU). See EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION
CONFERENCE, EIGHTH MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON TARIFF POLICY, Sept.
29 - Oct. 2, 1987. In a presentation to the working group IOCU called for divesti-
ture of the management and operation of CRSs from airlines, without prejudice to the
right of the airlines to own a CRS. Id.
- See 1985 Report of the Department of Justice to Congress on the Airline Computer
Reservation System Industry at 64-76 (Dec. 20, 1985) for a discussion of the benefits
and costs of divestiture in the United States.
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international communications and information networks
to market goods and services worldwide.1 6 While such
developments should add a positive stimulus to the reduc-
tion of bias, they are also likely to add to airline fears over
loss of control of their distribution systems. 17
It may be argued that the existence of a cartel-like prod-
uct distribution system based on standardized rules and
procedures, including fixed rates of commission for
agents, is an anachronism in the business world of the
1980s. On the other hand, this traditional system has
been elaborated from the internationally-agreed principle
that airlines have fair and equal access to foreign markets.
With the breakdown of this system, alternative and per-
haps more complex and controversial means of maintain-
ing international checks and balances would have to be
introduced. It may therefore be preferable for govern-
ments to take action to ensure that airlines, jointly if not
individually, retain control of airline industry-oriented
CRSs and of their partitions in multi-industry CRSs.
The approach of encouraging competition among the
CRS vendors, whether owned by airlines or by third par-
ties, shows greater promise than that of divestiture.1 8
Such competition could be assured internationally by gov-
ernment action. Specifically, governments could grant ac-
cess to their territories to foreign CRS vendors, prohibit
CRS vendors from denying participation in their system
to any airline which is prepared to pay the requisite fees
for the services concerned, and ensure that travel agents
and other users have unrestricted access to as many CRSs
as they wish. Assuming the existence of more general leg-
islation designed to protect the marketplace against abuse
- The "JAGUAR" system owned by Murdoch Electronic Publishing, part of a
worldwide news and publishing conglomerate, presents one example. Godwin,
Murdoch Offers Jaguar to Vendors, Travel Weekly, Feb. 1, 1988; System One, Murdoch
Will Install Jaguar for Subscribers this Year, Travel Weekly, Feb. 11, 1988.
,7 Such fears were articulated by IATA's Director General in presenting his An-
nual Report for 1986 to the 42nd IATA Annual General Meeting. Eser, The State of
the Airline Industry 1986, IATA REV., Oct.-Dec. 1986, at 6.
is The two approaches need not be mutually exclusive.
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of dominant position, such action should benefit passen-
gers and travel agents as well as provide nonvendor air-
lines with fair and effective opportunity to compete. Such
action could be taken nationally or, more pragmatically,
on the basis of bilateral reciprocity.' 9 For example, re-
cently proposed text for a bilateral air service agreement
between the United States and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands included the following principles: "to allow
importation of CRSs into each other's territory; to pro-
vide for nondiscriminatory 'national' treatment for instal-
lation and display; and to provide fair access to each
other's systems."20
Many governments believe that CRS issues are multilat-
eral in nature and should be addressed multilaterally. Re-
cent developments in Europe and the Asia/Pacific
regions, where national airlines have joined forces in or-
der to operate conglomerate CRSs21 , lend support to this
perspective. The multilateral approach was articulated at
the Third Air Transport Conference of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1985, resulting in a
study by the Organization of all relevant aspects of CRSs
with a view to the avoidance of abusive use of these sys-
tems at the international level.22
The technical aspects of this study are well advanced,
but the type of vehicle which might be used to package
and implement the emerging conclusions has yet to be de-
termined. ICAO in itself has no regulatory authority in
the field of air transport. The Organization's conclusions
in the field of air transport policy have generally been is-
- Not every element of reciprocity need be present; a national airline without
its own CRS would conceivably benefit from the availability of several CRSs in its
country in which it could participate.
2o As of April 1988, this text had not been finally agreed upon. See Secretariat
Study Group on Computer Reservation Systems, Study Note 11: Existing and Proposed Regu-
lation of CRSs, ICAO CRS-SN/I I (Nov. 1987); see also U.S.- Dutch Proposal Includes
Charters, Reservations Systems, Aviation Daily, May 7, 1987, at 210.
21 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for examples of recently formed con-
glomerate CRSs.
22 ICAO, Report of the Third Air Transport Conference, 37-38, ICAO Doc. 9470
(1985).
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sued as recommendations to its Member States, carrying
no binding force but functioning as a more or less effec-
tive medium for moral suasion. 3 ICAO has also issued
guidance material, again for optional use and adaptation
by its Member States, in the form of model clauses for
insertion into bilateral air service agreements or more de-
tailed advice regarding national policy and practice.
Some or all of these traditional approaches could be
used for dissemination of the results of ICAO's work on
computer reservation systems, at least in the short term.
For the longer term, a number of ICAO's Member States
have recently proposed a new and more prescriptive ap-
proach: the development of a multilateral agreement or a
code of conduct regarding CRSs. The nature, scope, and,
above all, the practicality of such an instrument have yet
to be expounded, but there are precedents for such forms
of regulation in other sectors. 24 This unprecedented phe-
nomenon in the field of air transport may yet prove to
warrant a precedent in the annals of ICAO.
2 The consultative and advisory role for ICAO is articulated in Article 55 of the
Chicago Convention on Permissive Functions of the Council. The only Annex to the
Chicago Convention in the field of air transport is Annex 9 - Facilitation. ICAO has
developed two multilateral agreements in the air transport field, each of which
arose out of the Chicago Conference in 1944 and entered into force in 1945: the
International Air Services Transit Agreement, currently ratified by 100 States, and the
International Air Transport Agreement, currently ratified by only 11 States and hence
of little practical value. For the text of these agreements, see ICAO Doc. 2187,
67-75; ICAO Doc. 7500, 3.
24 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON A CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES, at 4, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/13/ Add.l,
U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.D.12 (1974); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT, THE SET OF MULTILATERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND RULES FOR
THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, at 5, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev., U.N. Sales No. E.81.II.D.5. (1980); U.N.C.T.C. CUR-
RENT STUDIES, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/Ser.A/4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.15 (1986).
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